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ABSTRACT 
Kelly M. Wentland: The Effect of Industrial Diversification on Firm Taxes 
(Under the direction of Edward L. Maydew) 
This study investigates whether there is an empirical basis for one predicted benefit from 
industrial diversification: whether a conglomerate firm incurs lower tax liabilities than pure play firms. 
The results indicate that, on average, firms operating in multiple industries have lower tax liabilities than 
stand-alone firms. In additional cross-sectional tests, I identify conditions under which firms observe (or 
do not observe) tax benefits from diversification. Finally, I explore two simultaneous equations 
techniques from the diversification literature as alternate approaches for addressing endogeneity. Overall, 
this study furthers our understanding of the benefits of industrial diversification, providing initial 
evidence that conglomerates, on average, have lower tax liabilities than single-industry firms. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The media has featured a number of high-profile debates between activist investors like Trian 
Fund Management and management at conglomerates such as DuPont over the merits and pitfalls of 
operational diversification (Gopinath and Sikka, 2014).1 Given statements made by management at 
conglomerates like Berkshire Hathaway and General Electric, one of the key benefits from operating in 
multiple industries may be access to additional tax benefits. In his 2014 letter to shareholders, Warren 
Buffett cited “important tax benefits” as one reason voluntary spin-offs “make no sense for us” at 
Berkshire Hathaway (p. 33). Similarly, General Electric stated that concerns about losing tax benefits 
from its financing operations business unit, GE Capital, deterred the decision to sell the financing 
business for a long-time (Mann, 2015). In this study, I examine an empirical question central to the debate 
about the costs and benefits of industrial diversification: do firms operating in multiple industries pay less 
in taxes than firms operating in a single industry? 
The appeal of the conglomerate form has waxed and waned over time with success stories like 
3M Corporation and General Electric in contrast to notorious failures like Quaker Oats’s entry into the 
fruit juice market and RCA’s spread into computers, carpets, and rental cars (Markides, 1997). Some 
proponents of industrial diversification offer arguments for synergies in operations (e.g. leveraging 
research and innovation across multiple products and services), alternative financing sources (e.g. cross-
division internal capital markets as an alternative to external financing markets), and additional tax 
savings (Lewellen, 1971; Teece, 1980; Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994; Furrer, 2011). Others simply 
                                                          
1Other examples include articles with discussions from analysts, portfolio managers, and firm management about 
recent spin-offs like Abbott Laboratories and Energizer (Lachapelle and March, 2015; Wieczner, 2015; Benoit and 
Grind, 2015). 
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reference old adages like “not putting all your eggs in one basket” or more formal verbiage relating back 
to arguments for diversification in portfolio theory (Hindle, 2009).2   
At the same time, opponents like investment expert Peter Lynch, who coined the term 
“diworsification,” explain that diversifying to a certain extent may destroy the original business 
investment because management time, energy, and resources are diverted from the original focus (Lynch 
and Rothchild, 2000). Further, prior research suggests that management may be incentivized to diversify 
for their own benefit, rather than the interests of shareholders.3 Empirically, the financial economics 
literature is more consistent with the latter arguments, concluding that diversified firms trade at a discount 
or perform worse relative to pure play firms (specifically, see earlier studies like Lang and Stulz (1994) 
and Berger and Ofek (1995); more recently, Laeven and Levine (2007) in banks, and Humphery-Jenner 
(2013) in private equity funds). Despite this puzzle of the “diversification discount” in the valuation 
literature, little attention has been given to testing whether the individual benefits of diversification 
predicted in prior literature and practice are actually realized. That is, the diversification discount is only a 
puzzle as long as the assumptions about the benefits of diversification are, in fact, valid; hence, the 
purpose of this study is to examine the commonly held assumption that industrial diversification creates a 
tax benefit for firms. 
To investigate the effect of diversification on firm tax liabilities, I employ an empirical model 
following Hope, Ma, and Thomas (2013), which includes an extensive set of predictors used to explain 
firm tax liabilities from prior literature. In these tests using OLS, I find evidence supporting the prediction 
in prior literature that firms operating in multiple industries have lower tax liabilities than single industry 
firms on average. This finding is robust to four measures of diversification.  
                                                          
2Throughout the study, I use the terms diversified firm, conglomerate, and multiple industry firm interchangeably 
consistent with prior literature.  
3Because manager wealth comes from a single firm whereas shareholders can hold portfolios to offset risk from the 
individual firm, managers may prefer greater risk reduction through diversified internal operations than shareholders 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). Managers may also prefer to grow the firm in a more diverse or specialized way that 
makes them indispensable to the firm (Montgomery, 1994).  
3 
 
In the next set of tests, I use prior literature and institutional tax information to motivate three 
settings where I expect tax benefits from diversification to be more or less likely. I use these tests to 
identify conditions under which firms either do or do not observe tax benefits from diversification. 
Specifically, when the tax benefits from diversification act as a potential substitute for other tax benefits 
the firm may claim rather than as an incremental source of tax savings, I do not find evidence that 
multiple industry firms obtain significant tax savings over single industry firms. Further, I find that firms 
with little to only moderate demand for additional debt or following a low to moderate risk strategy do 
not appear to access additional tax benefits from diversification. That is, only firms with a high demand 
for debt capacity or high risk preference observe additional tax benefits related to diversification.  
Specifically, I proxy for the potential substitution effect for tax benefits from diversification with 
the extent of research and development activity a firm has using the restrictions on the General Business 
Credit to motivate a substitution effect. I proxy for a firm’s demand for additional debt capacity (risk 
preference) based on its financial constraints (return volatility) in the year it enters the sample. Taken 
together, this set of cross-sectional tests provide evidence that the main effect is properly identified in the 
sense that the results conform to the specific predicted sources of diversification tax benefits in the 
literature. Alternatively, had the tests revealed that the diversification tax benefit persists for subsets of 
firms where the tax benefits are not expected, it would cast doubt on whether the main effect is properly 
identified.    
In the last set of tests, I re-examine the average effect of diversification on firm tax liabilities 
using instruments for diversification proposed in Campa and Kedia (2002) in analysis using both two 
stage least squares and treatment effects models. Using these alternate approaches, which are common to 
the diversification literature, I find results consistent with my primary results, supporting a tax benefit on 
average from operating in multiple industries.  
This study contributes to the debate in the diversification literature and practice over the merits of 
operational diversification as a firm business strategy. Prior literature predicts there are many potential 
benefits from diversification (Lewellen, 1971; Teece, 1980; Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994; Furrer, 
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2011), but generally provides evidence supporting a valuation discount or underperformance for 
diversified firms overall when compared to single industry firms (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Rajan, Servaes, Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Humphery-Jenner, 2013). By documenting the specific tax 
savings linked with diversification, this study is the first to offer empirical support to one dimension used 
in assessing the merits of diversification. Further, by identifying different circumstances where I do or do 
not observe the tax benefit, I provide a tangible set of conditions for why we may observe differences in 
valuation effects across diversified firms. While assessing the valuation effect for the average firm is 
clearly important, examining individual benefits and costs of diversification (such as a firm’s tax benefit) 
may provide a greater set of tools for evaluating why diversification has appeared to work for some firms 
(e.g. 3M and General Electric) but not others. 
In addition to contributions to the diversification literature, the results in this study suggest that 
industrial diversification is an important factor to consider in future research on firm tax avoidance. While 
recent research suggests that industry expertise may be advantageous for claiming additional tax benefits 
(McGuire, Omer, and Wang, 2012), and previous research demonstrates that the influence of other 
important factors (like firm size) on taxes varies across industries (Zimmerman, 1983), studies in the 
literature generally link a firm with its primary industry and do not account for whether it has operations 
in other industries. To summarize the implications of this with an analogy, accounting for only the 
primary industry in which a firm operates, but not accounting for whether it operates in multiple 
industries, would be akin to addressing the fact that a firm is headquartered in the U.S. versus Ireland, but 
not accounting for the fact that it operates in multiple countries as opposed to operating only 
domestically.4 Moreover, unlike more complicated measures or variables that explain tax avoidance 
specific to proprietary data of limited accessibility, segment-based industry data is readily available in 
                                                          
4The two characteristics are also applicable to a similar proportion of firms. For example, from 1999-2013 (in my 
sample period), 25 percent of the firms on Compustat reported operating in multiple industries (based on reporting 
business segments in more than one four-digit SIC code), and 22 percent of firms on Compustat reported having 
foreign operations (based on reporting non-zero and non-missing pre-tax foreign income). 
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Compustat and can be easily incorporated into future tax research as an important determinant of a firm’s 
tax rate.5     
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops the hypothesis 
tested in the study and describes related literature. Chapter 3 details the research design, sample, and 
results for the primary analysis and cross-sectional tests. Chapter 4 re-examines the primary analysis 
using two instrumental variables techniques. Chapter 5 concludes the study discussing overall inferences 
and limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5This is in contrast to other factors shown to have important implications for firm tax outcomes that are difficult to 
incorporate into an empirical examination because these characteristics are not publicly disclosed. For example, 
Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010) use proprietary survey data to examine whether performance measurement of 
corporate tax departments (as a profit center as opposed to a cost center) affects firm effective tax rates. They find 
that firms evaluating tax departments as profit centers have significantly lower effective tax rates than firms 
evaluating their tax department as cost centers. Firms generally do not publicly disclose how they evaluate their tax 
department. 
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CHAPTER 2: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Diversifying through industry operations has been linked to several sources of tax benefits in 
prior literature and practice. The first two predicted tax benefits from diversification come from the 
literature linking hedging to income volatility. Smith and Stulz (1985) define hedging as both the use of 
operational decisions (such as operating in multiple industries) and derivatives (or other financial 
instruments) to reduce the covariance of streams of income with the state of the economy. Smith and 
Stulz (1985) use a simple model of after-tax firm value to argue that if a firm’s tax liability is a convex 
function of pre-tax income (i.e. the marginal tax rate is increasing with taxable income), then by Jensen’s 
Inequality, companies that can reduce the volatility of their income through hedging can obtain lower 
expected tax liabilities. Graham and Smith (1999) extend this analysis using simulation models to 
incorporate more realistic features of the tax code, like tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards, investment 
tax credits, and the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) and find that these features do not eliminate this 
benefit related to tax convexity but rather extend the range of pre-tax income over which the convexity 
applies.6 Based on the simulation analysis, Graham and Smith (1999) conclude that the average firm in 
their analysis faces a convex tax function and that if firms can reduce their pre-tax income volatility by 5 
percent then on average they can reduce expected tax liabilities by about 5.4 percent.  
The second tax benefit predicted from this literature results from implications of hedging for 
optimal capital structure. Firms that hedge are expected to carry a lower risk of default and as a result 
lending limits by creditors should be higher (Lewellen, 1971, Leland, 1998). Thus, firms have the 
opportunity to trade-off risk that was not tax-favored (with more exposure to tax convexity through 
                                                          
6They find that primary institutional features affecting firm tax convexity are its tax loss carrybacks and 
carryforwards. Practically speaking, tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards do not eliminate tax convexity primarily 
because of the uncertainty of available taxable income to offset within the carryback and carryforward periods and 
the time value of money (Majd and Myers, 1987).  
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volatile income streams in the absence of hedging) with tax-favored risk from additional debt capacity, 
resulting in greater interest deductions and lower tax liabilities (Lewellen, 1971; Stulz, 1996; Leland, 
1998). While these first two tax benefits may come from any form of income volatility reduction or 
hedging, the third and fourth predicted tax benefits from diversification are unique to operational forms of 
hedging (in this case, operating in multiple industries) as opposed to hedging with derivatives.  
These two operations-specific benefits relate to the firm’s ability to both use and uphold tax 
positions. The tax code contains extensive provisions for tax benefits targeted at specific industries.7 The 
dimension of industry for tax planning is also stressed by practice. For example, all of the Big Four 
discuss advantages for industry specific knowledge for tax functions on their websites.8 Yet, firms often 
face uncertainty about whether industry-specific tax benefits will remain available, which can affect the 
extent to which they will use certain tax positions.9 Related to this, the third tax benefit of industrial 
diversification is that, by operating in different industries, a diversified firm may have a broader portfolio 
of tax planning opportunities and may not be as sensitive to unfavorable changes to a single industry’s 
specific tax policies.  
Another type of uncertainty that may limit a firm’s use of tax positions is its expectation that 
whether, once a position is taken, it will be overturned by taxing authorities. The fourth benefit of 
operating in multiple industries is that it may reduce both the likelihood of being audited and the 
probability that, even if the firm is audited, the position will be overturned. This may result for two 
                                                          
7One example is the Investment Credit, which consists of credits specific to coal, gasification, and energy projects 
and the Credit for Increasing Research Activities (“R&D tax credit”) often linked to pharmaceutical, high tech, and 
manufacturing industries. Other examples include specialized tax treatment for intangible drilling costs for oil and 
gas companies and elections allowing the averaging/shifting of farm income over multiple tax years in agriculture. 
8Deloitte: http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/tax/solutions/tax-services-by-industry.html; Ernst & Young: 
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Industries; KPMG: http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/services/tax/pages/default.aspx;               
http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/industry/pages/default.aspx; PricewaterhouseCoopers: http://www.pwc.com/us/en/ 
industrial-products/publications/2015-tax-rate-benchmarking-study.jhtml 
9For example, a last-minute bill in 2014 extended 54 corporate tax breaks (including specific tax breaks for banks, 
the retail industry, and research and development) that corporations would have lost access to for their returns that 
year (Huffington Post, December 16, 2014). 
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reasons. First, firm taxes are often assessed by comparison with industry peers.10 11 In fact, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has 52 Audit Technique Guides, which are primarily used to assist its examiners 
assess unique tax and accounting methods of specific industries.12 When a firm operates in different 
industries, it may be more difficult for a taxing authority to identify, for example, an appropriate 
benchmark firm to flag whether the firm as having an abnormally low tax liability or questionable 
estimates of tax benefits.13 Further, when a diversified firm does come under audit, it may be more 
difficult for IRS examiners to evaluate the appropriate tax treatment of a more complex organizational 
structure (e.g. understanding unique inter-industry transfer pricing techniques available to multiple 
industry firms). Thus, by reducing uncertainty about both available opportunities to reduce tax liabilities 
and the likelihood positions taken will be overturned, diversified firms may be able to pay less in taxes 
than stand-alone firms. More broadly, the fact that the IRS audits based on industry-specific guidelines 
should alert tax researchers to the potential importance of investigating factors related to industries, and 
helps motivate the current study from a practice standpoint.  
Despite the potential for additional tax savings, there are at least four reasons diversified firms 
may not obtain lower tax liabilities than pure play firms (i.e. they may even have higher tax liabilities). 
First, the last benefit mentioned cuts both ways, in the sense that while it may be more difficult for 
auditors to audit a multi-industry firm (given industry-specific tax code provisions), it may also be more 
difficult or costly for firms to tax plan for multiple industries. Alternatively, pure play firms operating in a 
single industry may have a tax department that is highly specialized, in a better position to know their 
                                                          
10In a 2014 report on tax planning benchmarks, Pricewaterhouse Coopers explained that peer group comparisons, 
which are often based on industry, provide opportunities in planning and shaping the tax function: 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industrial-products/publications/2015-tax-rate-benchmarking-study.jhtml. 
11The IRS offers Industry Specific Tax Centers to provide businesses with specific guidance and analysis tools for 
assessing their tax planning relative to their industry. 
12IRS Audit Technique Guides are available at: http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Audit-Techniques-Guides-ATGs. 
13For example, it may difficult to identify an appropriate “tax peer” for companies that are diversified like 3M or 
General Electric. 
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industry’s tax provisions inside and out, so-to-speak. Dating back as early as Adam Smith, the gains from 
specialization have been well-established in economics, and there is no reason to believe that gains from 
specialization should not apply to tax practitioners at large, publically traded companies. An intuitive 
explanation of the tax cost for operating in multiple industries is simply that these firms’ tax departments 
are simply spread too thin, or less specialized, and therefore less adept at maintaining tax rates as low as 
single-industry firms.14  
Second, risk reduction is documented as an important motivator for diversification (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981). Shareholders can achieve their own desired level of risk through portfolio diversification and, 
thus, may have higher preference for the risk (and related returns) from any single firm. Instead, managers 
often maintain a major portion of their total income from their employment with a single firm through 
profit-sharing schemes, bonuses, and the value of stock options. As a result, a risk-averse manager may 
opt for the conglomerate form as a means to stabilize the firm’s streams of income, even if it is not valued 
by shareholders.15 As a result of this, diversified firms may simply not take advantage of additional tax 
planning opportunities even if they do exist (i.e. demonstrate no significant difference with stand-alone 
firms in terms of tax savings) or may even choose to reduce tax benefits taken if diversification is part of 
an overall firm strategy to reduce risk (paying higher taxes than pure play firms).  
Third, prior literature on derivatives and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) suggests firms may not 
receive all of the specific, predicted tax benefits from hedging. Graham and Rogers (2002) and Donohoe 
(2015) test the predictions from Graham and Smith (1999) that there may be tax incentives to hedge 
through derivatives. While Graham and Rogers (2002) find evidence consistent with greater interest tax 
shields from derivative use and Donohoe (2015) finds evidence of additional tax benefits unique to 
                                                          
14This viewpoint is consistent with the concerns about diverting management resources from the original focus of 
operations expressed in Lynch and Rothchild (2000). 
15Based this explanation, Amihud and Lev (1981) predict and find that the number of conglomerate mergers 
increases as the type of control in the firm moves from strong shareholder control to weak shareholder control and 
then to management control. At the same time, this type of control does not appear to be a significant motivator for 
non-conglomerate mergers, suggesting that the effect is not for general growth with mergers as opposed to the 
conglomerate form distinction. Further, May (1995) finds that firms with CEOs that have more personal wealth 
vested in their firm’s equity tend to diversify firm operations.  
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transactions with derivatives, neither study finds evidence that supports derivative use providing 
additional tax benefits from reduced tax convexity. Further, in their multivariate analysis, Devos, 
Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009) do not find evidence of greater debt tax shields from 
diversifying M&A in comparison to focused M&A. Overall, the results in these studies cast doubt on 
some of the individual tax benefit predictions from the general hedging and diversification specific 
literatures, motivating a more general empirical examination of industrial diversification on firm tax 
liabilities. 
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, while diversification is predicted to provide a number 
of other non-tax benefits that are expected to generate greater firm value (in addition to the tax benefits 
above), and a significant portion of firms continue to choose to operate in multiple industries, generally 
the literature finds evidence that, on average, diversified firms are valued at a discount or perform worse 
relative to pure play firms. This suggests that either firms are not realizing these benefits in reality or that, 
even if these benefits are being accessed, additional costs of the conglomerate form (which may have 
alternative tax consequences) offset these benefits for shareholders. While the above alternative points 
suggest it may be reasonable to expect that diversified firms claim no greater tax advantages than stand-
alone firms, I state the following hypothesis based on the greater tax benefit prediction (in the alternative 
form) given this is the perspective focused on in the diversification literature:  
H1: Diversified firms obtain lower tax liabilities on average. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE, AND RESULTS 
3.1 Research design for hypothesis 1 
To examine the hypothesis of this dissertation, H1, I employ an empirical model similar to Hope, 
Ma, and Thomas (2013): 
Taxi,t = β0 + β1 Diversificationi,t + ∑ β Controlsi,t + εi,t (1) 
To measure a firm’s tax liabilities, Taxi,t,, I use a firm’s cash taxes paid scaled by the market value 
of assets (Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t). Henry and Sansing (2015) document evidence that scaling by this 
market value of assets helps address concerns about data truncation bias. Scaling by this variable is 
particularly important for examining taxes in the setting of diversification for two reasons. First, because 
ETR-based measures divide by pre-tax book income reported in the financial statements, it only allows 
the measure to capture non-conforming (as opposed to conforming) forms of tax avoidance (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). Conforming (non-conforming) tax avoidance is a reduction in firm tax liability that 
affects a firm’s taxable income and pre-tax book income in the same way (differing ways). Because ETR-
based measures do not capture conforming tax avoidance, it will not reflect tax benefits of interest 
deductibility (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, p. 141) and potentially bias the results in a way directly 
relevant to this study’s hypothesis.  
In addition, ETR-based measures are generally not considered meaningful in years with negative 
pre-tax income (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008; Hope, Ma, and Thomas, 2013).16 As a consequence 
of this, studies using ETR measures generally exclude years with negative pre-tax income from the 
analysis. This restriction is of particular concern in this study because one of the predictions from the 
                                                          
16For example, say a firm has negative pre-tax income and had negative cash taxes paid (i.e. a refund when it has a 
loss). The ETR would be positive and potentially larger than for some firms that actually had positive pre-tax 
income and cash taxes paid. Alternatively, a firm could have negative pre-tax income and positive taxes paid, 
resulting in a negative ETR when taxes were actually paid. 
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literature is that diversification is expected to reduce income volatility, which may indicate that generally 
profitable diversified firms face less frequent exposure to loss years than stand-alone firms. As a result, 
this truncation restriction for negative pre-tax income years may affect diversified firms to a different 
extent than stand-alone firms and introduce a systematic bias in the estimator.   
The variable Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t is able to capture conforming tax avoidance and allows the 
inclusion of negative pre-tax income years because of the alternative scaling variable, market value of 
assets. As explained in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), a tax measure is able to capture conforming tax 
avoidance if the conforming tax avoidance does not affect the numerator and denominator of the tax 
measure in a way that preserves the value of the ratio without this type of avoidance (they discuss this in 
the context of scaling by cash flows from operations as an alternative to pre-tax book income in footnote 
49).17 It is reasonable to expect that lower cash taxes paid as a consequence of interest tax deductions 
would not affect the market value of assets in such a way that it would maintain the same ratio in the 
absence of such tax benefits. Thus, I expect this form of tax avoidance to be captured in this alternate 
measure. Further, the use of market value of assets as the scaling term precludes elimination of negative 
pre-tax income years because it maintains a meaningful ratio in these years (because the denominator is 
still positive in these years).18 
The primary variable for Diversificationi,t is an indicator for whether a firm operates in multiple 
industries (Multiple industriesi,t) similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) and prior literature on diversification, 
taking the value of one when a firm operates in multiple industries and equaling zero otherwise. In 
                                                          
17Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) discuss cash flow from operations as an alternative scaler to use to try and capture 
conforming tax avoidance. However, cash flow does not as clearly eliminate the two concerns above for two 
reasons. First, it is more reasonable to expect that interest expense and the related tax deduction would affect the 
cash flow denominator and cash taxes paid in a way that preserves the tax variable ratio in the absence of this 
expense/deduction than it is to expect that this ratio would be maintained in the presence of this tax benefit when 
scaling by market value of assets. Further, scaling by cash flow from operations does not resolve the issue of 
truncation with negative denominator values as cash flow is negative nearly as frequently as when pre-tax income is 
negative. However, I do want to note that Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) do not offer the alternative cash flow scaling 
variable as a suggestion for addressing the loss truncation issue.  
18See Henry and Sansing (2015) for a discussion of the motivation and validation of the alternate scaling variable in 
addressing truncation bias in tax measures. 
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addition to Multiple industriesi,t, I examine three alternative proxies for Diversificationi,t based on firm 
segment reporting: # of industriesi,t, % sales in other industriesi,t, and Sales-weighted distancei,t. The 
variables Multiple industriesi,t and # of industriesi,t follow from the single versus multi-segment firm 
representation of diversification used in Berger and Ofek (1995). The measure % sales in other 
industriesi,t is based on the measure of multinational or geographical diversification in Creal, Robinson, 
Rogers, and Zechman (2013), which uses the percent of foreign sales as the extent of diversification. 
Sales-weighted distancei,t captures how similar the segmented industries inside the firm are to the primary 
industry of the overall firm. This measure is based on the “relatedness” measure used in Khorana, 
Shivdasani, Stendevad, and Sanzhar (2011). I use a decile rank form of the latter two measures, % sales in 
other industriesi,t and Sales-weighted distancei,t for ease of comparison across the two measures. Based on 
H1 and the standard assumption in the diversification literature, I expect to find that more diverse firms 
pay less in taxes on average (i.e. a negative and significant coefficient estimate on Diversificationi,t (β1)). 
Following prior literature on tax avoidance, I include an extensive set of control variables to 
account for other tax planning opportunities, incentives, and common firm activities with differences in 
book (financial accounting) and tax reporting that may affect firm taxes. The extent of foreign operations 
(Foreign pre-tax income i,t) and a firm’s decision to not disclose disaggregated geographic earnings (No 
disclosurei,t) are associated with lower firm taxes (Rego, 2003; Hope, Ma, and Thomas, 2013). Larger 
firms may have greater economies of scale for tax planning yet may draw greater attention from tax 
authorities and the public, generating mixed predictions for the effect of firm size (Sizei,t) on firm taxes 
(Zimmerman, 1983; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Rego, 2003). Firms with additional leverage 
(Leveragei,t) may benefit from additional debt tax shields. Available tax loss carryforwards (Tax Loss 
Carryforwardi,t) and whether the firm has gathered (used) more of these carryforwards in the current 
period (Increase in tax loss carryforwardi,t) can also affect firm taxes. Inclusion of controls for tax loss 
carryforwards are particularly important in this setting because they may offset some of the consequences 
of asymmetric tax treatment of income and losses.  
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More profitable firms (proxied by Pre-tax incomei,t) may have higher taxes simply because of 
related higher taxable income. Yet, at the same time, these firms may have greater incentives and 
resources to lower their taxes (Rego, 2003; Henry and Sansing, 2015). The remaining controls represent 
firm activities that are treated differently for book and tax reporting purposes, which may also affect firm 
taxes. Specifically, I inlcude controls for fixed assets  (PP&E i,t), R&D and intangibles intensity (R&Di,t 
and Intangiblesi,t), and the extent of earnings from unconsolidated subsidiaries (Equity Incomei,t). Finally, 
following the prior literature on diversification, I include firm (i) and year (t) fixed effects to account for 
other, unobserved, time-invariant factors across firms (e.g. general firm business strategy) and other 
factors that may vary for all firms across time (e.g. macroeconomic conditions or tax policy changes).19 20 
3.2 Sample and descriptive statistics 
The Compustat sample used for this study runs from 1999 to 2013. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) changed the requirements for segment reporting for all fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 1997. Because the diversification measures come from business 
segment data, I begin the sample in 1999 to have consistent segment reporting requirements throughout 
the entire sample period. I exclude firm-years with more than one observation for a firm (e.g. a year when 
a firm changes its fiscal year-end). I then require non-missing values for Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t, Multiple 
Industriesit, and the control variables discussed in equation (1) as described in Appendix I. Similar to 
prior literature examining diversification using segment data, and to ensure completeness of firm segment 
                                                          
19Discussions in prior literature suggest that unobserved, time-invariant factors affecting a firm’s diversification 
choice can influence the observed outcomes of diversification. A common approach to account for these factors in 
the diversification literature is the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects in an OLS specification (Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Dimitrov and Tice, 2006; Lin, Pantzalis, and Park, 2007; Gopalan and Xie, 2011; Ammann, Hoechle, 
and Schmid, 2012; and Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack, 2012). Laeven and Levine (2007), Klein and 
Saidenberg (2010), and Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013) focus on forms of diversification in financial institutions 
and incorporate bank level fixed effects in their designs for the same purpose. I have also considered industry and 
year fixed effects. However, this approach fails to account for factors that vary across firms within each industry, 
which may bias inferences made with this analysis. Results with industry and year fixed effects differ.  
20All of the studies applying the firm fixed effects model discussed in the prior footnote (except Goetz, Laeven, and 
Levine (2013)) use instrumental variable techniques with instruments proposed in Campa and Kedia (2002) in 
conjunction with their OLS fixed effects models to address endogeneity concerns. I perform analysis using these 
instruments in Chapter 4. 
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reporting for the diversification measures, I exclude firm-years where the sum of sales or assets across 
reported segments deviated from the firm’s total sales or assets, respectively, by more than ten percent.21 
The final sample has 26,910 firm-year observations.22 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. The number of observations 
differs for alternate continuous measures of diversification, Return Volatilityi,t, and SA Indexi,t because 
these continuous measures are not required for the primary sample, but are confined to the specific 
analysis using these additional variables. The average Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t of 0.0091 is analogous to an 
average cash ETR of 0.32, which is consistent with the mean cash ETR values in Hope, Ma, and Thomas 
(2013).23  Overall, the control variable summary statistics are similar to those in Hope, Ma, and Thomas 
(2013) and prior literature.  
Table 1 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the multiple industry and single industry 
subsamples. Overall, firm-years with operations in multiple industries make up 20 percent of the full 
sample. A few other descriptive statistics from this table are worth noting. Related to specific predictions 
for taxes, on average, firms operating in multiple industries have higher Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t values but 
lower Leveragei,t. The higher Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t and lower Leveragei,t means for multiple industry 
firms provide preliminary evidence in contrast to the literature’s predictions for tax benefits overall and 
                                                          
21For example, Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia (2002) require non-missing segment data and exclude 
observations where the sum of segment values of sales deviates from the Compustat annual total sales value by one 
percent. In more recent studies, Ammann, Hoechle, and Schmid (2012) and Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack 
(2012) exclude observations where the sum of segment values of sales or assets deviates by five percent. I use a ten 
percent threshold for this comparison to maintain as many observations as I can while still ensuring completeness. 
The ten percent threshold for sales and assets is based on the SFAS 131 threshold defining a reportable segment. 
22A comparison of the descriptive statistics for my final sample and Compustat using one-sample z-statistics shows 
that for most variables there is no statistical difference in means. However, of those variables with a statistical 
difference, the only ones with much difference in terms of economic magnitudes (a difference of greater than 5 
percent) are Increase in tax loss carryforwardi,t and Pre-tax incomei,t. However, there is no difference in the median 
Increase in tax loss carryforwardi,t across my sample and Compustat, and the medians are much closer in value for 
Pre-tax incomei,t (2 percent of total assets for Compustat and 4 percent of total assets for my sample). This suggests 
the differences in means for these variables results from the presence of more extreme values for these variables in 
Compustat that affect the mean but not the median values. Thus, the two differences observed do not offer an 
obvious indication of bias for my analysis. 
23The cash ETR value is calculated by multiplying Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t with the average MVA for the sample 
(2,526) and dividing by the average pre-tax income for the sample (71). 
16 
 
for additional interest tax shields from diversification. Consistent with the comparison of means, in Panel 
C, the Pearson (Spearman) correlations reported above (below) the diagonal in Panel C show a positive 
relation between Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t and each of the diversification measures, suggesting 
Diversificationi,t relates to paying higher taxes. At first glance, this suggests that diversified firms may not 
have access to greater tax savings and may even have higher tax liabilities. However, this observation is 
based on univariate analysis and does not account for both observable and unobservable differences 
between firms, which are considered in the later multivariate tests. A final point on the correlation matrix 
is that the four proxies for diversification are significantly and positively correlated as expected if these 
variables capture the same construct. 
3.3 OLS results using alternative measures of diversification  
The results for the OLS estimations of equation (1) are reported in Table 2. The different columns 
in Table 2 use the aforementioned four alternative proxies for Diversificationi,t. Generally, the control 
variables have the predicted associations with taxes from prior literature. For example, I observe that 
firms with greater values of Leveragei,t and R&Di,t have lower values of Taxi,t. The R-squared values in 
my analysis are also reasonable in comparison with recent tax avoidance studies using similar models. 
With respect to H1, the prediction that diversified firms have lower tax liabilities than stand-alone 
firms on average suggests that I should observe a negative relation between Diversificationi,t and Cash 
taxes paid/MVAi,t. Consistent with this, the coefficient on Diversificationi,t across all four columns is 
negative and significant (t-statistics ranging from -1.92 to -2.35), indicating that diversification is 
associated with paying lower tax liabilities.24 For ease of interpretation, I focus on column (1) for 
discussion of economic magnitudes as this uses the primary measure of Diversificationi,t in the literature. 
Based on column (1), I find that, on average, firms operating in multiple industries have a 0.0013 lower 
Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t than firms operating in a single industry.25 At the sample average, this is 
                                                          
24Results are robust to instead running a simplified firm and year fixed effects model excluding controls. 
25Results throughout the study are robust to controlling for MVA. 
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analogous to a 4.6 percentage point lower cash ETR associated with Diversificationi,t.26 In terms of 
comparable magnitudes, Gallemore and Labro (2015) find that an absence of a restatement due to errors 
(absence of a Section 404 material weakness) is associated with a 2 (5) percentage point reduction in cash 
ETR.  
The results from Table 2 support the anecdotes from management at conglomerates like 
Berkshire Hathaway and General Electric suggesting that tax benefits for diversification may offer one 
explanation for why these firms do not (or at least hesitate to) spin-off different operating components to 
refocus. Further, this offers empirical support for what has previously been an assumed benefit in the 
diversification literature. However, given the attention by activist investors and the evidence for the 
diversification discount in prior literature, it is possible that not all firms that diversify realize these tax 
benefits.  
3.4 Cross-sectional tests 
In this section, I investigate settings that could be effective null or zero tests, identifying subsets 
of firms where I may not expect to observe significant tax savings from diversification, while contrasting 
them with subsets of firms where I would expect to find the most pronounced effect. Predictable cross-
sectional variation in the diversification effect could provide initial evidence that the primary effect is 
properly identified (or at least not spuriously related to taxes). Further, these cross-sectional tests provide 
a more nuanced view of the main effect, which could help inform the broader valuation literature on the 
costs and benefits of industrial diversification.  
3.4.1 Research design – R&D activity 
One way that diversification may not offer additional tax benefits to firms would be if the 
additional potential tax benefits it produces directly reduces access to other forms of tax benefits the firm 
would have as a single industry firm. For example, the General Business Credit (GBC) allowed by the 
                                                          
26The cash ETR interpretation for the average sample firm is calculated by multiplying the Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t 
coefficient with the average MVA for the sample (2,526) and dividing by the average pre-tax income for the sample 
(71). 
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IRS is an aggregation of the R&D tax credit and 35 other tax incentives, such as the investment credit, 
enhanced oil recovery credit, renewable electricity production credit, and incentives for agricultural 
business.27 However, the aggregate GBC amount is limited based on the excess of the taxpayer’s net tax 
liabilities over $25,000. Thus, a firm that already has access to one type of credit (e.g. a large R&D tax 
credit) under the GBC may not gain as much from accessing other GBC incentives for other industries. 
Based on this example, the first test investigates whether firms with greater levels of research and 
development (R&D) activity observe less tax benefits from diversification. 
I proxy for the potential tax benefit substitution effect with the extent of R&D activity a firm has 
(R&Di,t), re-estimating equation (1) for partitions of low, moderate, and high R&D activity. Specifically, I 
classify a firm as Low R&D (High R&D) if it has R&Di,t less than the 33rd percentile (greater than the 67th 
percentile) for R&D active firms during the year.28 Firms with R&Di,t between the 33rd and 67th percentile 
for R&D active firms during the year are classified as Moderate R&D. I predict that if diversification 
offers distinct, industry-specific tax benefits, like those listed in the GBC, then I should observe (should 
not observe) tax savings related to diversification when I expect industry specific tax benefits to be 
incremental to (substitutable for) industry-specific tax benefits the firm would have access to as a single 
industry firm as proxied by low R&D (high R&D). Conversely, if the tax benefit I observe on average is 
unrelated to industry-specific tax benefits (like those in the GBC), then I would be less likely to observe a 
difference in the diversification effect across the high and low R&D partitions (as evidence of a 
substitution effect). 
3.4.2 Research design – demand for debt capacity 
Next, I examine whether firm demand for debt capacity affects the extent of tax benefits from 
diversification. One source of tax benefits from diversification is predicted to follow from increased debt 
capacity and the related interest deductions (Lewellen, 1971; Stulz, 1996; Leland, 1998). However, for 
                                                          
27For a comprehensive list of the other tax incentives, see IRC Sec. 38(b). 
28R&D active firms are considered those that have non-zero R&Di,t. 
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diversification to generate tax benefits through this channel, a firm must actually take advantage of 
additional debt financing. Thus, I expect that firms with greater (less) demand for additional debt to be 
more likely to obtain greater (fewer) tax benefits from diversification. I use whether a firm is financially 
constrained to proxy for its demand for additional debt capacity.  
Traditional pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer internal to external financing, and then 
debt to equity financing, at least in part because of the high transaction costs of issuing new securities 
(Myers, 1984; Fama and French, 2002). This model predicts that a firm’s use of debt is driven by a firm’s 
net cash flows or financial constraints in that more financially constrained firms are forced into using 
equity financing when they would otherwise prefer internal funds or leverage. Thus, I would expect that if 
diversification offers additional debt capacity in general that financially constrained firms would be those 
most likely to take advantage of it. 
I proxy for firm financial constraints using the SA indexi,t from Hadlock and Pierce (2010), where 
higher values of the index represent greater financial constraint.29 I re-estimate equation (1) for partitions 
of low, moderate, and high financial constraints. Specifically, I classify a firm as having Low Constraints 
(High Constraints) if it has an SA index value less than the 33rd percentile (greater than the 67th 
percentile) value for firms in the year it enters the sample. A firm with an SA index between the 33rd and 
67th percentile values in the year it enters the sample is classified as having Moderate Constraints. I 
predict that if diversification offers firms additional debt capacity and related interest tax shields then I 
should (should not) observe tax savings related to diversification when firms are more highly (less) 
constrained. Conversely, if diversified firms do not observe gain access to additional debt capacity (and 
related debt tax shields), I should not expect to observe a different diversification effect across the low 
and high constraint partitions. 
 
 
                                                          
29See the detailed definition for the variable in Appendix I. 
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3.4.3 Research design – firm risk preferences 
Finally, recall the prediction that diversification may be part of a more general, firm strategy or 
preference and that this may influence observed outcomes from diversification. While in my test for the 
on average effect (in Table 2) I attempt to control for unobserved firm strategies by including firm fixed 
effects, in my last cross-sectional test I consider one dimension of general firm strategy and how that 
affects the tax benefits observed with diversification.30 Specifically, I consider tax outcomes related to 
diversification for firms with different risk preferences.  
Earlier in the study, I predicted that one reason I may not observe tax benefits from 
diversification is because it may be part of a firm’s general low risk strategy where these firms simply 
choose not to take advantage of additional tax savings even if they are available. If this prediction holds, 
then I should not observe tax benefits from diversification for low risk firms. Alternatively, if any tax 
savings opportunities are available from diversification, I would expect high risk firms that diversify to be 
those most likely to claim these benefits. 
To assess whether differences in firm risk influence observed tax benefits from diversification, I 
use a common measure for firm risk, a firm’s Return volatilityi,t, in the year it enters the sample and re-
estimate equation (1) on partitions for low, moderate, and high risk strategy firms.31 Similar to the test 
partitioning on the SA index, I classify a firm as Low Risk (High Risk) if it has return volatility less than 
the 33rd percentile (greater than the 67th percentile) value for firms in the year it enters the sample. A firm 
with return volatility between the 33rd and 67th percentile values in the year it enters the sample is 
classified as Moderate Risk. I predict that if diversification offers additional tax savings in general I 
                                                          
30The results in Table 2 for the on average effect are robust to including the variables I use to proxy for firm risk 
preference and demand for debt capacity (return volatility and SA index, respectively). Equation (1) already includes 
the R&D variable (used for the first cross-sectional test) as a control. 
31See the detailed definition for the variable in Appendix I. 
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should be most likely (least likely) to observe evidence of this savings when firms follow a high risk (low 
risk) strategy.32 
3.4.4 Results for cross-sectional tests 
Results for the cross-sectional tests for firm R&D activity, demand for debt capacity, and risk 
preference are reported in Tables 3-5, respectively. Columns (1)-(3) in each table report the estimation of 
equation (1) for firms with low, moderate, and high values of the partitioning variables, respectively. 
While I do not make specific predictions related to the moderate (middle) columns, I include them for 
completeness. Note that in some of the columns the regression analysis drops No disclosurei,t because 
there is not enough variation in the variable within that partition (after controlling for other covariates) to 
include it. 
The R&D test results in Table 3 show that for firms with low R&D activity (where I expect the 
greatest potential for incremental tax benefits from the GBC) Diversification i,t  has the predicted negative 
relation with Cash taxes paid/MVAi,t (column (1): coefficient -0.0013, t-statistic -2.11).33 Further, for 
firms with high R&D activity in column (3) (those more likely to have a substitution effect with the 
GBC), I do not find evidence of lower tax liabilities from diversification. Specifically, the coefficient (t-
statistic) on Diversificationi,t in this column is 0.0056 (1.58).  A cross-equation test indicates that the 
coefficient estimates of Diversificationi,t in columns (1) and (3) (Low R&D and High R&D firms, 
respectively) are statistically different (2 = 16.50, p-value = 0.000).34 Overall, the results in Table 3 are 
                                                          
32A setting I considered but did not include in the cross-sectional analysis is the role of variation in corporate 
governance on potential tax benefits from diversification. However, this set of cross-sectional tests is the focus of a 
recent working paper Zheng (2015). Like Zheng (2015), I do not find evidence of differences in the diversification 
effect across different proxies for corporate governance factors such as institutional ownership or insider ownership.  
33I include the variable R&Di,t as a control for each partition to account for variation in R&D activity within the 
partition. However, if I exclude this control and re-estimate each column, the sign, magnitude, and significance of 
the coefficient on Diversificationi,t is very similar and do not change the inferences made above. For example, the re-
estimation for column (1) has a coefficient of -0.0014 and the t-statistic is -2.17. 
34The cross-equation tests throughout this section are performed by estimating the low and high column regressions 
demeaning by firm and year. The tabulated OLS regressions with firm and year fixed effects use the xtreg command 
with the dfadj option to account for degrees of freedom from the firm fixed effects. However, the command for the 
cross-equation test in Stata (suest) does not support xtreg command nor the robust option. For this reason, I run the 
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consistent with incremental, industry-specific, tax benefits contributing to the on average diversification 
tax benefit observed in Table 2. 
In Table 4, I use the firm’s SA index value in the year it enters the sample as a measure of 
demand for debt capacity. I only observe greater tax savings related to Diversificationi,t  (a negative 
association with firm tax liabilities) in the partition for firms with high financial constraints (with the 
highest expected demand for debt capacity) (column (3): coefficient -0.0025, t-statistic  -2.21). For low 
constraint (demand) firms in column (1), I do not find evidence of significant tax savings for diversified 
firms. Specifically, the coefficient (t-statistic) on Diversificationi,t in this column is -0.0001 (-0.15). A 
cross-equation test indicates that the coefficient estimates of Diversificationi,t in columns (1) and (3) (Low 
Constraint and High Constraint firms, respectively) are statistically different (2 = 11.13, p-value = 
0.001). Thus, the results in Table 4 are consistent with firms gaining access to greater debt capacity and 
related tax shields through diversification. 
In Table 5, I use the firm’s return volatility in the year it enters the sample as a measure of firm 
risk preference. I do not observe support for additional tax savings from diversification for either low or 
moderate risk firms. Specifically, the coefficients (t-statistics) on Diversificationi,t in this columns (1) and 
(2) are 0.0000 (0.04) and -0.0008 (-0.807), respectively. I only find greater tax savings associated with 
Diversificationi,t (a negative association with firm tax liabilities) for high risk firms (column (3): 
coefficient -0.0035, t-statistic -3.09). A cross-equation test indicates that the coefficient estimates of 
Diversificationi,t in columns (1) and (3) (Low Risk and High Risk firms, respectively) are statistically 
different (2 = 8.85, p-value = 0.003). The results in Table 5 suggest that firms diversifying, potentially as 
part of a low risk firm strategy, do not claim tax benefits from diversification. Taken together, the results 
from the cross-sectional tests conform to expectations about the underlying motivations for the tax benefit 
from diversification and support the primary results by providing settings where the effects, if properly 
identified, should be plausibly different.  
                                                          
firm and year demeaned regression with the traditional reg command analogous to firm and year fixed effects to 
perform the cross-equation test. 
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CHAPTER 4: ENDOGENEITY 
The literature on diversification has documented a number of selection and endogeneity issues 
and has provided some guidance toward addressing them.35 A series of studies in the literature have 
focused on whether the reasons firms choose to diversify explain why prior research documents a 
negative relation between firm value and diversification (i.e. the “diversification discount”). My primary 
tests include firm and year fixed effects to account for unobserved time invariant factors across firms (like 
general firm business strategy) and macroeconomic conditions that affect all firms in a given year in the 
same way, which may be endogenous to a firm’s decision to diversify. Further, the cross-sectional tests 
provides some additional evidence that the main tax effect observed is not spurious by documenting a tax 
benefit (or lack of tax benefit) from diversification where it is most (least) expected. In this section, I use 
two alternative techniques from the literature to address additional concerns with endogeneity. 
Campa and Kedia (2002) use the fixed effects approach in my primary analysis and two 
additional techniques using a simultaneous equation framework, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 
treatment effects model (a form of selection model), to account for the endogeneity of a firm’s 
diversification choice.36 To this end, I consider a set of firm, industry, and year level instruments (Ii, t, k) 
for diversification proposed in Campa and Kedia (2002) in the following equations where: 
Tax adjustedi,t = β0 +  β1 Diversificationi,t + Σ β Controlsi,t, + εi,t                                     (2) 
Diversificationi,t  = α0 + Σ α Ii,t,k + Σ α Controlsi,t + µi,t                                                     (3)  
                                                          
35Examples include: Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), Villalonga (2004a,b), and Li 
and Prabhala (2007). 
36The approaches and instruments proposed in Campa and Kedia (2002) have been used frequently in the 
diversification literature to address endogeneity concerns, including in the following studies: Dimitrov and Tice 
(2006), Laeven and Levine (2007), Lin, Pantzalis, and Park (2007), Klein and Saidenberg (2010), Gopalan and Xie 
(2011), Ammann, Hoechle, and Schmid (2012), Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack (2012), and Hann, Ogneva, 
and Ozbas (2013). 
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Following their study, I use two firm instruments to account for the ease with which a firm can 
change between being diversified and focused in a single industry. Specifically, firms included in the 
S&P Indexi,t and Listed on a Major Stock Indexi,t are expected to have greater visibility and liquidity, 
making it easier to move between a diversified and focused structure. The time instruments are proxies 
for business cycles, macroeconomic conditions, and merger waves. Business cycles and macroeconomic 
conditions are captured by the concurrent and lagged # of Contraction Months during the Yeart and % 
Change in Real GDPt. Merger waves are accounted for by the Number of M&A Announced during the 
Yeart and Dollar Value of M&A Announced during the Yeart. The two industry instruments represent the 
attractiveness of a given industry to (potential) conglomerates. Specifically, the measures are the Fraction 
of Industry Firms that are Multi-Industryi,t and the Fraction of Industry Sales from Multi-Industry 
Firmsi,t.37 See Appendix I for additional detail on the variable definitions. 
I use an adjusted tax variable as the outcome of interest, Tax adjustedi,t, which is demeaned by 
firm and year.38 Campa and Kedia (2002) explain that by using an adjusted outcome variable in this way 
the outcome variable is, by construction, uncorrelated with characteristics that affect the outcome of 
interest on these dimensions in the same manner (i.e. for a firm across all years or all firms in a given year 
in the same way). As a result, they expect that, by construction, the instruments are unlikely to be 
uncorrelated with εi,t,. The authors conclude that given the variables above are expected to be reasonable 
predictors of a firm’s diversification decision and are not expected to affect the outcome of interest (in its 
adjusted form) directly, then the above set of variables are valid instruments for this design.39 The 
                                                          
37I include one of the instruments used in Campa and Kedia (2002) in both equations (2) and (3) (i.e. use it as a 
control in both equations rather than as an instrument). The variable is an indicator for whether a firm is 
incorporated in a foreign country (Incorporated Outside the U.S.i,t). Given the prevalence of attention to 
multinational tax planning, I include this variable in both stages as part of Xi,t to allow it to have both an indirect 
effect on firm taxes through the firm’s diversification choice and a direct effect on taxes in the second stage. 
38This is analogous to a firm and year fixed effect estimator used in the earlier tests.  
39Larcker and Rusticus (2010) express concerns regarding the use of industry aggregates and lagged variables as 
instruments. I cannot rule out the authors’ concerns for these variables with the aforementioned design. I include the 
the instrumental variable analysis for completeness as it has been used extensively in the diversification literature. 
However, following the recommendations of Larcker and Rusticus (2010), in my analysis using this design I include 
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remaining variables in equations (2) and (3) Diversificationi,t and Controlsi,t are defined in the same way 
as for equation (1). 
The results for the 2SLS and treatment effects approaches are reported in Table 6. For ease of 
reference, I include the primary fixed effects OLS results from Table 2 in column (1) of Table 6 Panel A, 
given that these three methodologies are all commonly used in conjunction in the literature.40 The 
estimates from equation (2) (equation (3)) are reported in Panel A (Panel B). When comparing the results 
for my primary OLS specification with the results under these alternative simultaneous equations 
approaches, the coefficients on Diversificationi,t in all three columns (for all three approaches) are 
negative and significant, supporting a consistent tax benefit on average from diversification across all 
three estimation approaches.  
While I include the 2SLS and treatment effects models for completeness given their prevalence in 
the literature, I express caution when relying on the instrumental variable test inferences in place of the 
primary results given the results of several diagnostic tests I examine related to these tests. Wooldridge 
(2002) and Larcker and Rusticus (2010) recommend that researchers applying an instrumental variables 
design use a series of diagnostic tests to assess the appropriateness of the design for a specific research 
setting. Three tests they discuss are used to assess the validity of the set of instruments: an F-test 
examining the null that the instruments do not enter equation (1), an overidentification test of the null that 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in equation (2), and a review of an R-squared in a 
first-stage regression to assess how well equation (1) explains the endogenous diversification choice. 
These tests of the validity of the instruments help assess whether the set of instruments: 1) are correlated 
with the diversification choice after accounting for other control variables and 2) are uncorrelated with the 
second stage residual. The final test is a Hausman test used to assess the null hypothesis that the OLS 
                                                          
a series of diagnostic tests on the use of these instruments in my setting. I note the caveats or limitations related to 
their concerns in the concluding statements from this analysis below. 
40The 2SLS and treatment effects models are estimated with a maximum likelihood estimator. 
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fixed effect specification is a consistent estimator for Diversificationi,t under the assumption that 2SLS is 
a consistent but inefficient estimator. 
I report the results of the F-test, overidentification test, and the R-squared for the first stage 
regressions in Table 6 Panel B. The Hausman test is untabulated but is discussed below. Overall, the F-
test and the R-squared related to the first stage regression provide some evidence that the set of 
instruments are not weak in terms of their ability to predict a firm’s diversification choice. However, the 
overidentification test suggests that it may not be valid to assume the instruments should be excluded 
from the second stage. Furthermore, the Hausman test does not allow me to reject the null of the 
exogeneity of Diversificationi,t in my primary OLS fixed effect specification in comparision with the 
2SLS estimator.  
Specifically, the F-statistics (p-values) reported in Table 6 Panel B columns (1) and (2) are 2,627 
(0.000) and 1,715 (0.000), respectively, far exceeding the threshold for a weak instrument suggested in 
Staiger and Stock (1997). 41 Further, the R-squared and pseudo R-squared for the first stages reported in 
columns (1) and (2) of 0.210 and 0.214, respectively, suggest that equation (2) explains a meaningful 
portion of the variation in Diversificationi,t overall. However, the Hansen J Statistic for the 
overidentification test reported in Panel A for column (1) allows a rejection of the null that the set of 
instruments are valid.42 Finally, a Hausman test comparing the OLS fixed effects specification to the 
2SLS specification (untabulated) does not allow me to reject the null that the OLS fixed effects 
specification is a consistent estimator for my setting (p-value = 0.174) in comparison with the 2SLS 
estimation.  
                                                          
41The F-test used comes from Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997). These studies suggest 
that the standard asymptotic approximations for instrumental variables breaks down when instruments are weak, 
where they offer an F-statistic less than ten as an indication of when the instruments are weak. 
42The treatreg command in Stata does not support the overid post-estimation command, which is why I do not report 
an overidentification test statistic for the treatment effects model. However, the same set of instruments and outcome 
of interest are used in both the 2SLS and treatment effects models, suggesting the instruments would likely generate 
a similar inference from an overidentification test for the treatment effects specification. 
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Overall, while the two instrumental variables techniques are conventional approaches to 
addressing endogeneity in the diversification literature, the results from the diagnostic tests in my setting 
are (at best) mixed, and do not allow me to rely on the instrumental variables approaches to rule out 
sources of endogeneity. Thus, I cannot rule out factors that are not addressed by inclusion of firm and 
year fixed effects in the OLS estimation (e.g. factors that can vary within the firm over time) that are also 
consistent with my cross-sectional test results.  
However, it is important to note here that if the potentially unresolved endogeneity bias works in 
the direction of a tax cost from diversification (bias toward zero or a positive coefficient), then this bias 
should not alter the inferences based on the sign of the primary findings in this study, but instead indicate 
that the observed coefficient magnitudes for the tax benefit observed are understated. An obvious factor 
that could induce this form of bias based on the literature is whether a firm’s risk strategy changes over 
time (is not addressed by firm fixed effects) and influences both a firm’s decision to diversify and its tax 
liabilities. If a firm switches from a high to a lower risk strategy and diversifies as part of this change in 
strategy, I would expect the firm to either claim no additional tax benefits from diversification or perhaps 
even avoid less tax on average (generating a tax cost from diversification). Thus, to the extent that my 
design above does not account for this form of endogeneity, the tax benefit observed may be understated.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
An extensive line of academic research spanning multiple decades, along with debates in practice, 
suggest that the value of corporate diversification as part of business strategy remains a puzzle. This paper 
takes a unique approach to examining corporate diversification by focusing on a specific predicted benefit 
from this literature (namely, additional tax savings) rather than the valuation effect overall. I find that, on 
average, firms operating in multiple industries have lower tax liabilities than single industry firms. 
However, where the additional tax benefits from diversification are expected to act as a substitute for tax 
positions already available, for firms that do not carry high financial constraints, or for firms without a 
high risk preference, I do not observe significant additional tax savings related to diversification. The 
combined set of results here provide greater understanding about the conditions under which a firm may 
obtain one of the key cited benefits from industrial diversification.  
Like much of the diversification literature, the results in this study are subject to an important 
limitation. Ultimately, diversification is a strategy that firms decide whether or not to employ that is not 
assigned randomly. Thus, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that there are unobservable factors that 
relate to both this decision and firm tax liabilities. However, a plausible factor left unaccounted for in the 
design above (changes in firm risk strategy over time) likely induces a form of bias that would understate 
the tax benefit I observe. While this paper nor the literature more generally can rule out this limitation, my 
results suggest an interesting avenue for future research is to examine other, specific benefits (or costs) 
from diversification (e.g. leveraging research and innovation across multiple products and services) to 
inform the debate to help provide a greater understanding of why we observe success from diversification 
from some firms, but not others. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
Panel A Full Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   N Mean Std dev 
Cash taxes paid/MVA it  26910 0.0091 0.0130 
Multiple industries it  26910 0.1969 0.3976 
# of industries it  26229 1.2244 0.5204 
% sales in other industries it  25926 28.4220 42.8638 
Sales-weighted distance it  26098 0.4671 0.8050 
No disclosure it  26910 0.9569 0.2030 
Size it  26910 5.0701 2.3750 
Leverage it  26910 0.7824 1.8742 
Market-to-book it  26910 2.4106 6.3765 
Tax loss carryforward it  26910 0.6236 0.4845 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it  26910 0.3878 0.4873 
Pre-tax income it  26910 -0.1654 1.2933 
Foreign pre-tax income it  26910 0.0054 0.0235 
PP&E it  26910 0.2590 0.2899 
R&D it  26910 0.0522 0.1343 
Equity income it  26910 0.0003 0.0026 
Intangibles it  26910 0.1449 0.2260 
Return volatilityit  22223 -3.4431 0.5520 
SA Indexit  26884 -3.0092 1.1128 
Panel B Single and Multiple Industry Firm Descriptive Statistics 
 Single industry firms  Multiple industry firms 
Variable  N Mean Std dev  N Mean Std dev 
Cash taxes paid/MVA it 21612 0.0086 0.013  5298 0.0112 0.0131 
No disclosure it 21612 0.956 0.205  5298 0.9606 0.1947 
Size it 21612 4.8809 2.3581  5298 5.8421 2.2859 
Leverage it 21612 0.8089 2.0569  5298 0.6742 0.7542 
Market-to-book it 21612 2.505 6.8154  5298 2.0254 4.1064 
Tax loss carryforward it 21612 0.6239 0.4844  5298 0.6227 0.4848 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it 21612 0.3922 0.4883  5298 0.3698 0.4828 
Pre-tax income it 21612 -0.2085 1.4256  5298 0.0104 0.4088 
Foreign pre-tax income it 21612 0.0049 0.0235  5298 0.0077 0.0235 
PP&E it 21612 0.2465 0.2885  5298 0.3097 0.2902 
R&D it 21612 0.0612 0.1466  5298 0.0158 0.0479 
Equity income it 21612 0.0002 0.0023  5298 0.0006 0.0035 
Intangibles it 21612 0.1356 0.2226  5298 0.1832 0.2355 
Return volatilityit 17442 -3.4081 .5541  4781 -3.5709 0.5250 
SA Indexit 21586 -2.8780 1.1342  5298 -3.5437 0.8285 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX – CONTINUED 
Panel C Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Cash taxes paid/MVA it  0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.11 -0.01 -0.33 0.16 0.08 0.01 -0.16 0.04 0.03 
(2) Multiple industries it 0.13  0.85 0.24 0.31 0.01 0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.07 0.08 
(3) # of industriesit 0.13 0.99  0.25 0.32 -0.01 0.18 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.05 0.04 0.09 -0.12 0.08 0.06 
(4) % sales in other industriesit 0.09 0.46 0.47  0.82 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.11 -0.00 0.07 
(5) Sales-weighted distance it 0.08 0.53 0.53 0.97  0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.05 
(6) No disclosure it -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.07 0.02 -0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
(7) Size it 0.26 0.15 0.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07  -0.14 0.17 -0.14 0.23 0.21 0.13 -0.09 0.10 0.16 
(8) Leverage it -0.17 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03  -0.09 0.07 -0.56 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.00 0.01 
(9) Market-to-book it 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.44 -0.11  -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 
(10) Tax loss carryforward it -0.29 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.13 0.07 -0.03  -0.14 0.06 -0.07 0.21 -0.05 0.15 
(11) Pre-tax income it 0.56 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.43 -0.13 0.36 -0.36  0.06 0.04 -0.22 0.03 0.03 
(12) Foreign pre-tax income it 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.14 0.25 -0.03 0.12 0.07 0.22  -0.02 -0.00 0.06 0.08 
(13) PP&E it 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.11 0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.02  -0.17 0.03 -0.15 
(14) R&D it -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 -0.22 0.18 0.28 -0.14 0.13 -0.15  -0.06 -0.02 
(15) Equity income it 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.08  0.00 
(16) Intangibles it 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.11 -0.04 0.22 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.18 -0.02 0.08 0.03  
Table 1 Panels A and B present the descriptive statistics for different samples. In Panel C, I report the Pearson (Spearman) correlation matrix 
above (below) the diagonal for the full sample. Statistical significance for correlations significant at the 10% level or better are bolded. See 
Appendix I for variable descriptions. All continuous variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles with the following exception. Variables 
with zero for many observations in the bottom of their distributions (e.g. R&D it and Foreign pre-tax income it) are truncated only at the top 
percentile. In Panel A, the number of observations differs for alternate continuous measures of diversification because the truncation for these 
continuous measures is not required for the primary sample.  
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TABLE 2: OLS REGRESSIONS OF TAX ON DIFFERENT DIVERSIFICATION MEASURES 
Dependent Variable:   Cash taxes paid / MVA it  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Diversification it    -0.0013** -0.0008* -0.0002** -0.0002** 
    (-2.346) (-1.923) (-2.174) (-2.158) 
No disclosure it    0.0031 0.0049*** 0.0031 0.0031 
    (1.333) (3.657) (1.330) (1.293) 
Size it    0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
    (6.251) (6.027) (6.158) (6.040) 
Leverage it    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (-0.133) (-0.149) (-0.351) (-0.341) 
Market-to-book it    -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
    (-7.975) (-7.883) (-8.016) (-7.687) 
Tax loss carryforward it    -0.0054*** -0.0056*** -0.0056*** -0.0055*** 
    (-10.322) (-10.361) (-10.361) (-10.082) 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it    -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 
    (-4.787) (-4.703) (-4.564) (-4.839) 
Pre-tax income it    0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 
    (4.187) (4.062) (3.860) (3.763) 
Foreign pre-tax income it    0.0068 0.0072 0.0063 0.0070 
    (1.394) (1.465) (1.285) (1.424) 
PP&E it    -0.0030*** -0.0029*** -0.0032*** -0.0029*** 
    (-4.360) (-4.244) (-4.077) (-4.039) 
R&D it    -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0021** -0.0016** 
    (-2.643) (-2.666) (-2.502) (-2.285) 
Equity income it    0.1068** 0.0961* 0.1072** 0.1134** 
    (2.249) (1.932) (2.270) (2.239) 
Intangibles it    -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0007 
    (-1.301) (-1.199) (-1.469) (-1.258) 
Intercept    0.0097*** 0.0089*** 0.0103*** 0.0103*** 
    (4.182) (5.854) (4.338) (4.291) 
Diversification measure: 
   
Multiple 
industries it  
# of 
industries it 
% sales in 
other 
industries it 
Sales-
weighted 
distance it 
Firm fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared    0.652 0.654 0.650 0.653 
N      26,910 26,229 25,926 26,098 
Table 2 presents the estimates of equation (1). Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the measure of 
Diversificationit used. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
I define the variables in Appendix I.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 3: EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION WITH VARIED R&D ACTIVITY 
Dependent Variable:   Cash taxes paid / MVA it  
    
Low  
R&D 
Moderate 
R&D 
High  
R&D 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Diversification it    -0.0013** -0.0031 0.0056 
    (-2.110) (-1.464) (1.582) 
No disclosure it    0.0025*** 0.0021  
    (3.402) (0.754)  
Size it    0.0011*** -0.0004 -0.0002 
    (7.126) (-1.197) (-0.901) 
Leverage it    0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0000 
    (0.280) (-0.763) (-0.107) 
Market-to-book it    -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0000** 
    (-6.118) (-3.377) (-2.121) 
Tax loss carryforward it    -0.0052*** -0.0056*** -0.0049** 
    (-8.477) (-4.076) (-2.025) 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it    -0.0011*** -0.0003 0.0002 
    (-4.581) (-0.628) (0.576) 
Pre-tax income it    0.0004*** 0.0032*** -0.0001 
    (5.008) (3.418) (-0.667) 
Foreign pre-tax income it    0.0140* -0.0092 -0.0040 
    (1.850) (-1.141) (-0.401) 
PP&E it    -0.0032*** 0.0008 0.0005 
    (-4.270) (0.252) (0.250) 
R&D it    -0.0312 -0.0103 -0.0004 
    (-1.017) (-1.208) (-0.608) 
Equity income it    0.1179** 0.0063 0.0375 
    (2.163) (0.058) (0.417) 
Intangibles it    -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0003 
    (-1.208) (-1.088) (-0.332) 
Intercept    0.0099*** 0.0158*** 0.0084*** 
    (10.143) (4.299) (4.527) 
Firm fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared    0.657 0.629 0.637 
N           20,638 4,008 2,264 
Table 3 presents the estimates of equation (1) across firms with increasing values of the size-age 
index from Hadlock and Pierce (2010) in columns (1)-(3), respectively. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. I define the variables in Appendix I.  The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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TABLE 4: EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION WITH VARIED FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
Dependent Variable:   Cash taxes paid / MVA it  
    
Low 
Constraints 
Moderate 
Constraints 
High 
Constraints 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Diversification it    -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0025** 
    (-0.153) (-1.410) (-2.208) 
No disclosure it    -0.0029*** 0.0056***  
    (-6.696) (10.127)  
Size it    0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0003 
    (2.085) (2.372) (1.522) 
Leverage it    -0.0023*** -0.0011*** -0.0000 
    (-2.594) (-2.735) (-1.511) 
Market-to-book it    -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0000*** 
    (-4.408) (-5.650) (-3.061) 
Tax loss carryforward it    -0.0032*** -0.0053*** -0.0081*** 
    (-4.223) (-6.286) (-7.063) 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it    -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009*** 
    (-0.818) (-0.818) (-3.177) 
Pre-tax income it    0.0189*** 0.0078*** 0.0000 
    (3.592) (6.056) (0.790) 
Foreign pre-tax income it    -0.0070 -0.0063 0.0126 
    (-0.727) (-0.943) (1.151) 
PP&E it    -0.0026 -0.0022* -0.0037*** 
    (-1.523) (-1.696) (-4.251) 
R&D it    0.0020 0.0029 -0.0005 
    (0.366) (1.260) (-0.848) 
Equity income it    0.0660 0.0833 0.1412* 
    (1.153) (0.826) (1.727) 
Intangibles it    -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0002 
    (-0.393) (-0.580) (-0.227) 
Intercept    0.0150*** 0.0093*** 0.0146*** 
    (7.707) (6.238) (11.478) 
Firm fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared    0.660 0.652 0.651 
N           8,974       10,663 7,256 
Table 4 presents the estimates of equation (1) across firms with increasing values of the size-age 
index from Hadlock and Pierce (2010) in columns (1)-(3), respectively. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. I define the variables in Appendix I.  The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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TABLE 5: EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION WITH VARIED FIRM RISK 
Dependent Variable:   Cash taxes paid / MVA it  
    
Low  
Risk 
Moderate  
Risk 
High  
Risk 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Diversification it    0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0035*** 
    (0.035) (-0.807) (-3.085) 
No disclosure it     0.0076*** 0.0049*** 
     (5.182) (9.189) 
Size it    0.0005 0.0005 0.0006*** 
    (1.534) (1.491) (3.373) 
Leverage it    -0.0010* -0.0026*** -0.0003 
    (-1.647) (-3.015) (-1.017) 
Market-to-book it    -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0001*** 
    (-3.348) (-5.296) (-4.154) 
Tax loss carryforward it    -0.0018** -0.0065*** -0.0060*** 
    (-1.987) (-7.517) (-5.638) 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it    -0.0008* -0.0001 -0.0006* 
    (-1.821) (-0.204) (-1.949) 
Pre-tax income it    0.0225*** 0.0119*** 0.0003 
    (3.946) (4.606) (1.164) 
Foreign pre-tax income it    -0.0127 0.0004 -0.0001 
    (-1.148) (0.053) (-0.016) 
PP&E it    -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0026** 
    (-1.607) (-1.461) (-2.299) 
R&D it    0.0021 0.0088** -0.0005 
    (0.205) (2.378) (-0.499) 
Equity income it    0.0852 0.1304 0.0765 
    (1.219) (1.378) (0.802) 
Intangibles it    -0.0033** 0.0020* -0.0015* 
    (-1.994) (1.715) (-1.664) 
Intercept    0.0127*** 0.0098*** 0.0056*** 
    (6.248) (4.922) (3.748) 
Firm fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared    0.685 0.624 0.607 
N      7,971 8,279 6,404 
Table 5 presents the estimates of equation (1) across different partitions of firm return volatility. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. I define the 
variables in Appendix I.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 6: COMPARING TWO IV APPROACHES TO OLS ANALYSIS 
Panel A OLS and Second Stages    
Dependent Variable: 
Cash taxes paid / 
MVA it 
Cash taxes paid / 
MVA it - Adjusted 
  OLS 2SLS 
Treatment 
Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Diversification it  -0.0013** -0.0021*** -0.0017*** 
  (-2.346) (-4.455) (-4.161) 
No disclosure it  0.0031 0.0001 0.0000 
  (1.333) (0.374) (0.262) 
Size it  0.0008*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (6.251) (4.870) (4.597) 
Leverage it  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (-0.133) (-0.773) (-0.800) 
Market-to-book it  -0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
  (-7.975) (-5.910) (-5.800) 
Tax loss carryforward it  -0.0054*** 0.0001 0.0001 
  (-10.322) (0.577) (0.503) 
Increase in tax loss carryforward it  -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
  (-4.787) (-5.090) (-5.096) 
Pre-tax income it  0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0001* 
  (4.187) (-1.701) (-1.784) 
Foreign pre-tax income it  0.0068 0.0004 0.0003 
  (1.394) (0.150) (0.113) 
PP&E it  -0.0030*** -0.0001 -0.0002 
  (-4.360) (-0.711) (-0.915) 
R&D it  -0.0017*** -0.0001 0.0001 
  (-2.643) (-0.151) (0.136) 
Equity income it  0.1068** 0.0514** 0.0481** 
  (2.249) (2.260) (2.131) 
Intangibles it  -0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
  (-1.301) (1.587) (1.501) 
Incorporated Outside U.S. it   -0.0004** -0.0004** 
   (-2.396) (-2.340) 
Intercept  0.0097*** -0.0096*** -0.0096*** 
  (4.182) (-33.171) (-33.431) 
N   26,910 26,905 26,905 
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TABLE 6: COMPARING TWO IV APPROACHES TO OLS ANALYSIS – CONTINUED 
Panel B First Stages 
   Dependent Variable: Diversification it 
 
(1) 2SLS  
(Linear Probability) 
(2) Treatment Effects 
(Probit) 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient z-stat 
Campa and Kedia (2002) Instruments     
S&P Indexit 0.0993*** (3.77) 0.3013*** (3.495 
Listed on a Major Stock Indexit 0.0065 (0.48) 0.0477 (0.763) 
# of Contraction Months during the Yeart 0.0017* (1.93) 0.0099** (2.493) 
# of Contraction Months during the Yeart-1 0.0015 (1.51) 0.0084* (1.900) 
% Change in Real GDPt 0.0024 (0.94) 0.0105 (0.897) 
% Change in Real GDPt-1 0.0015 (0.92) 0.0084 (1.054) 
Number of M&A Announced during the Yeart -0.0000 (-0.86) -0.0000 (-1.562) 
Dollar Value of M&A Announced during the Yeart 0.0000 (1.31) 0.0001** (2.043) 
Fraction of Industry Firms that are Multi-Industyit 0.8594*** (24.69) 3.0401*** (22.220) 
Fraction of Industry Sales from Multi-Industry Firmsit  -0.0197 (-1.00) 0.0733 (0.834) 
Second Stage Variables     
No disclosureit 0.0702** (2.51) 0.2686** (2.002) 
Sizeit 0.0183*** (6.43) 0.0681*** (5.201) 
Leverageit -0.0005 (-0.40) -0.0146 (-1.082) 
Market-to-bookit -0.0020*** (-5.39) -0.0110*** (-4.372) 
Tax loss carryforwardit 0.0443*** (3.94) 0.2164*** (4.420) 
Increase in tax loss carryforwardit -0.0034 (-0.51) -0.0035 (-0.116) 
Pre-tax incomeit 0.0030 (1.63) 0.0515** (2.227) 
Foreign pre-tax incomeit -0.0329 (-0.19) 0.1319 (0.172) 
PP&Eit 0.0219 (1.23) 0.1474** (1.982) 
R&Dit -0.1106*** (-6.11) -1.6184*** (-4.907) 
Equity incomeit 4.6468*** (2.82) 13.5915** (2.242) 
Intangiblesit 0.0576*** (2.95) 0.2960*** (3.769) 
Incorporated Outside U.S.it 0.0026 (0.15) 0.0025 (0.032) 
Intercept -0.2282*** (-4.89) -2.5866*** (-11.378) 
F-test of first stage IVs (F-statistic)      2,627***   1,715***  
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Overidentification test (Hansen J  statistic)  209.713***        −  
(p-value) (0.0000)        −  
R-squared (2SLS)/Pseudo R-squared (Treatment) 0.210  0.214  
N  26,905  29,905  
Table 6 Panel A presents the OLS results from Table 2, 2SLS, and treatment effects estimations in 
columns (1)-(3), respectively. The 2SLS and treatment effects estimations use an adjusted tax measure 
that is demeaned by firm and year. See Appendix I for variable descriptions. The instrumental variables 
(exclusion restrictions) used for the 2SLS and treatment effects models are drawn from Campa and Kedia 
(2002). The only change I make to the set of instruments is to include Incorporated Outside the U.S. in 
both stages rather than as an instrument (i.e. rather than assume it has no direct effect on firm taxes after 
accounting for the control variables in the second stage). Panel B presents the first stages of the 2SLS 
and treatment effects models in columns (1) and (2), respectively. T-statistics/Z-statistics are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. Variables are defined in Appendix I.  The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS  
Taxit proxies43 
Cash taxes paid/MVAit Cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the market value of assets. The 
market value of assets equals total assets (AT) plus the product of 
share price and common shares outstanding (PRCC_F x CSHO) less 
stockholders equity (SEQ), based on the definition of the market value 
of assets in Henry and Sansing (2015). 
Cash taxes paid/ MVA it - 
Adjusted 
Cash taxes paid/MVAit demeaned by year and firm. 
 
Diversificationit proxies (segment data from Compustat historical segment database) 
Multiple industriesit An indicator equal to one if the number of industries (based on primary 
four digit SIC codes (SICS1)) reported is greater than one; zero 
otherwise 
# of industriesit The number of industries (based on four digit primary SIC codes) 
reported per firm-year 
% sales in other industriesit The percent of total segment sales (sum of SALES) that are in different 
industries (based on primary four digit SIC codes (SICS1)) than the 
firm’s industry 
Sales-weighted distanceit I first calculate the “distance” of each reported industry unit within a 
firm. Distance is defined based on the idea of relatedness in Khorana et 
al. (2011). If a reported industry in the segment data (SICS1) is in the 
same four digit SIC code as the firm (SIC), it has a distance = 0. If it is 
in the same three digit SIC code but not the same four digit SIC code, 
its distance = 1. If it has the same two digit SIC code but not the same 
three digit SIC code, its distance = 2. If it has the same one digit SIC 
code but not the same two digit SIC code, its distance =3. If it does not 
have the same one digit SIC code, then its distance = 4. I then weight 
each industry unit’s distance by industry unit sales (SALES) to get an 
overall weighted-sales distance measure for each firm-year 
 
Control and Cross-Sectional Test Variables 
No disclosure it An indicator equal to one for observations that do not disclose 
geographic earnings in the post-SFAS 131 period; zero otherwise, 
following Hope et al. (2013). If missing, it is set equal to one 
Size it The natural log of the product of share price and common shares 
outstanding (PRCC_F x CSHO) 
Leverage it Total liabilities (LT) divided by lagged total assets (AT) 
Market-to-book it The product of share price and common shares outstanding (PRCC_F 
x CSHO) divided by common/ordinary equity (CEQ) 
Tax loss carryforward it An indicator equal to one if tax loss carryforward (TLCF) is positive; 
set equal to zero otherwise 
Increase in tax loss 
carryforward it 
An indicator equal to one if tax loss carryforward (TLCF) is greater in 
the current year than in the prior year; set equal to zero otherwise 
Pre-tax income it Pre-tax income (PI) divided by lagged total assets (AT) 
                                                          
43Variables throughout reference Compustat Fundamentals Annual database unless another data source is explicitly 
referenced in the description. 
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Foreign pre-tax income it Pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) divided by lagged total assets (AT) 
where missing values of PIFO are set equal to zero 
PP&E it Property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) divided by lagged total assets 
(AT) where missing values of PPENT are set equal to zero 
R&D it Research and development expense (XRD) divided by lagged total 
assets (AT) where missing values of XRD are set equal to zero 
Equity income it Equity in earnings (ESUB) divided by lagged total assets (AT) where 
missing values of ESUB are set equal to zero 
Intangibles it Intangible assets (INTAN) divided by lagged total assets (AT) where 
missing values of INTAN are set equal to zero 
Return Volatility it The natural log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the 
firm over the 12 months leading up to fiscal year-end (CRDP.DSF 
variable RETX) 
SA Index it Similar to Hadlock and Pierce (2010): equals -0.737 x Size_HP it + 
0.043 x Size_HP it
2 – 0.040 x Age_HP it where Size_HP it equals the 
natural log of total assets and age equals the difference between the 
current year t and the first year in Compustat (YEAR1). Following 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010), total assets is set equal to $4.5 billion if it 
exceeds this value when determining Size_HP it, and Age_HP it is set 
equal to 37 for values greater than 37. 
 
Campa and Kedia (2002) Instrumental Variables 
S&P Indexit An indicator equal to one if the firm was included in the S&P 500 
during the fiscal-year; equal to zero otherwise. A firm is determined to 
have been on the S&P 500 during the year if there was at least one day 
within the 12 months leading up and including the fiscal-year end date 
that the firm was included in CRSP.DSP500LIST. 
Listed on a Major Stock 
Indexit 
An indicator equal to one if the firm is listed on Nasdaq, NYSE, or 
AMEX, (EXCHG codes equal to 14, 11, or 12); equal to zero 
otherwise 
# of Contraction Months 
during the Yearit 
The number of months in the calendar year the firm’s fiscal-year-end 
falls in that are classified as contraction months on the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) U.S. Business Cycle 
Expansions and Contractions document dated 9/20/10. Set equal to 
zero if no contraction months on this document for the year. 
% Change in Real GDPit The percent change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) not 
seasonally adjusted from the St. Louis FRED for the calendar year the 
firm’s fiscal-year-end falls in. 
Number of M&A Announced 
during the Yearit 
The aggregate number of deals announced in year t on SDC 
Platinum’s Mergers & Acquisitions database including completed 
deals for acquisitions of both U.S. and non-U.S. targets. To be 
included the deal must have a non-missing date announced and deal 
number and must not be a buyback or recapitalization. 
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Dollar Value of M&A 
Announced during the Year it 
The aggregate transaction value (in millions of dollars) of deals 
announced in year t on SDC Platinum’s Mergers & Acquisitions 
database including completed deals for acquisitions of both U.S. and 
non-U.S. targets. To be included the deal must have a non-missing 
date announced, deal number, and transaction value and must not be a 
buyback or recapitalization. 
Fraction of Industry Firms 
that are Multi-Industy it 
The percent of Compustat firms in the year with non-missing business 
segment data that operate in multiple industries (Multiple industriesit 
equal to one). 
Fraction of Industry Sales 
from Multi-Industry Firms it 
The percent of sales for Compustat firms in the year with non-missing 
business segment data that operate in multiple industries (Multiple 
industriesit equal to one). 
Incorporated Outside U.S.it An indicator equal to zero if the country of incorporation (FIC) is 
equal to USA; equal to one otherwise 
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